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Abstract 
What is time? And why does it matter to international politics? Despite evidence that time is 
central to political life, international-relations theories often taken it for granted. Important 
efforts to address such oversights critique influential disciplinary assumptions and expand 
our perspective on temporal experience. But they do not substantially deepen our 
understanding of time, let alone its relationship to politics. International-relations theory 
retains entrenched habits of thinking and speaking about time that isolate inquiry, constrain 
dialogue, and reify time as a stand-alone object detached from social relations and 
processes. This theory note therefore reconstructs international relations’ temporal 
imagination. Instead of relying on pre-existing, static concepts of time, it develops a 
framework from the basic activity of timing: practical efforts to establish relationships 
between various changes according to a standard that enables orientation, direction, and 
control. Timing theory explains the political origins of time and the power of our most 
familiar ideas about it. It also resolves key problems attending other temporal research. 
Finally, it offers scholars more dynamic ways to analyze the temporal politics of important 
phenomena like war and identity. It thus highlights how, in both practice and theory, 
international politics is very much a matter of timing. 
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Introduction 
On March 17, 2014, just after an overwhelming and conspicuous majority in a popular 
referendum voted to reunite with Russia, the Crimean parliament announced it would jump 
local clocks ahead two hours to Moscow Standard Time. Amidst shadowy military clashes, 
questionable voting, and escalating displays of Russian and Ukrainian identity, lawmakers 
considered it vital to divorce Sevastopol’s hours from Kiev’s—to make Crimea more Russian 
by changing time zones. When this took effect, and 22:00 became midnight in a single 
second, the Crimean Prime Minister declared to a crowd full of Russian flags, “I greet you 
with our return home” (Baczynska 2014). Upon hearing this, the crowd burst into the Russian 
national anthem as Crimea quite literally re-timed itself to Moscow’s rhythm and rule.  
 
Such overt connections between time and international politics are nothing new. During 
World War I, military schedules assumed that there would be virtually no delay between 
mobilization and hostilities and so they made no allowances for turning armies away from the 
front. World War I became known as the “war by timetable” (see Hom 2010, 1166) and 
ended with an armistice signed around 5:00 in Paris, but delayed to take effect just over six 
hours later: at 11:11 on 11/11/19 (Oulahan 1919). With appalling symmetry, this act of 
timing produced 11,000 further casualties. Elsewhere, surprising events like the end of the 
Cold War, major terrorist attacks, or the Arab Spring signal that time itself is “out of joint”: 
that the present is unstable, the future full of danger (see Weiner 2001; Stürmer 2016). 
Political actors also express temporal concerns, as when members of the United States 
Congress debating Syrian intervention worried that airstrikes would initiate a “sequence of 
events” of “great risk and great uncertainty” and the prospect of “a new open-ended war” 
(Khan 2013).  
 
These examples illustrate the significance of time to the study and practice of international 
politics. We might therefore expect international-relations theorizing to focus on the temporal 
character of political processes, events, and institutions. But the field only pays sporadic 
attention to time. This overall neglect of the subject has, in turn, enabled ahistorical, overly 
spatial, and static (or ‘timeless’) accounts of dynamic phenomena. 
  
This may be changing. Mainstream research typically identifies time only with clock and 
calendrical reckoning. But other, mainly critical, approaches seek to redress international 
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relations’ “evasion of time” (Agathangelou and Killian 2016, 5) and to “open up the 
problematic of time” (Hesford and Diedrich 2010, 6) by highlighting a multiplicity of other 
political temporalities. These efforts substantially expand our disciplinary perspective on 
time. They show that international politics is not only intrinsically temporal but also 
temporally diverse. 
 
Yet, I contend, international-relations scholarship has not substantially deepened our 
understanding of time itself, or its relationship to politics. Temporal analyses seldom engage 
with one another. Moreover, many of them manifest deeply embedded habits of speaking and 
thinking about time—ones that limit our ability to unpack its significance and analyze it 
rigorously. In particular, both mainstream and critical approaches marginalize dynamic 
processes and reify time as a static thing apart from social life. So even as international-
relations theory begins to acknowledge time’s importance to international politics, scholars 
rely on and reproduces meager theoretical instruments for making sense of time.  
 
This theory note reconstructs international relations’ temporal imagination. It argues that we 
should focus on timing: the practical efforts by which social agents establish meaningful 
relationships between processes of change so that they unfold in ways conducive to 
orientation, direction, and control. As the examples above suggest, timing processes are 
common to international politics. If repeated successfully, they may produce symbolic 
descriptions of a “time” or “temporality” that comes to seem “real” and independent of social 
existence. Yet this status stems not from any accurate description of an ontological prior, but 
rather from those symbols’ ability to transmit useful information about orienting ourselves in 
dynamic environments. References to time, even those deemed “universal” or matters of 
common sense, thus primarily serve as markers of the underlying timing practices that give 
international politics its temporal character.  
 
I make this argument by drawing on the work of Norbert Elias. I develop his insights into a 
dynamic, systematic, and political approach to time. By beginning with timing instead of 
time, this framework avoids or resolves the problems of current approaches, which tend to 
separate time from politics. It also sharpens critical challenges to dominant times while 
rendering those challenges more consistent with their own theoretical commitments. Finally, 
timing theory adds explanatory value to the wider field of international relations. It highlights 
overlooked, but important, factors in key topics, such as war and identity. In these ways, 
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timing theory reconfigures not only how we understand time in theory but also, more 
broadly, how we grapple with international politics in time.  
 
The note first outlines how time matters in international-relations research and discusses 
limitations of the existing literature. In the next section, it  constructs a theory of timing. The 
third section explains the advantages of this approach, including how it explains, on the one 
hand, the emergence of time from politics and, on the other hand, how it overturns 
conventional wisdom about time. The fourth section illustrates timing’s wider explanatory 
power through examples from the Vietnam War and identity research. The conclusion links 
timing theory to other international-relations research and highlights important issues arising 
when we treat international politics as a matter of timing.  
 
How time matters in the study of international relations 
Amidst a growing literature, we can discern three primary ways that time matters for 
international-relations theory.1 First, mainstream scholars treat time as a natural and neutral 
dimension in which international politics occurs (Gaddis 1992, 38). If they specify this 
dimension, researchers measure time with clocks and Gregorian calendars. Causes-of-war 
studies construct observations and explanations from “the raw facts” of “nation-years” 
(Singer and Diehl 1990, 12–21). Time series analyses vary attributes over calendrical 
duration (see Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2014, 8). Event hazard models correlate this duration 
with outcome likelihoods (for example, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 1414). 
Alternatively, conflict studies treat calendrical duration as a proxy variable or “intensity 
dimension” (Moore 2006, 7). These literatures do not reflect on the relatively recent historical 
emergence of such time-reckoning practices. They treat time as an obvious and obviously 
quantified feature of the wider world, rather than a concept developed to understand that 
world. Such customs structure the field more broadly: “the twenty years’ crisis,” watershed 
dates like 9/11, and citation practices all reinforce the dominance of clock and calendar time. 
These customs make it seem that “it still ‘really is’ [2018], regardless of what anyone 
chooses to call it” (see McIntosh 2015, 470). Research in this vein that takes time “seriously” 
primarily labors to solve technical challenges posed by diachronic data, such as variable 
dependence or serial correlation (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998, 1283–1284). So time matters 
                                                
1 These non-exhaustive and idealized divisions highlight shared themes and important distinctions 
between diverse works (see Jackson 2011, 37). 
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only inasmuch as it serves conventional modes of inference (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2014, 
22–26) enabling generalization and prediction (see McIntosh 2015, 475–79).  
 
Second, alongside clock and calendar time, international relations reflects an older tradition 
treating time as a problem requiring a solution. By its very essence, time’s passage brings 
dissolution, discord, and death (Bryson 2007, 9; Stevens 2015, 43). It is a cruel god, 
destabilizing force, or “universal devourer” (Ovid 2004, 605; see Brandon 1965, 31-64; 
Gunnell 1987, 12-16). Especially during periods of uncertainty, international-relations 
scholars tap into these themes (see Hom 2016, 170–71), despairing of the natural 
“vicissitudes and hazards of time” left unchecked by sound knowledge or stable practices 
(Niebuhr 2008, 85; Anderson 2011, 3). More generally, they perceive time as naturally 
antagonistic to democracy (Scheuerman 2004, xiii-xv), institutional efficiency (see Hanrieder 
2015, 3), and reliable causal inference (Box-Steffensmeier 2014 et al. 2014, 25–26). So time 
also matters as an intrinsic challenge to international political practice and theory. 
 
Third, recent works challenge clock and calendar time and its links to statist worldviews.  
Critical scholars chart temporal diversity in politics and advocate time pluralism or 
“heterotemporality” in theory (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010, 186; Çalkıvik 2016, 238; 
Hutchings 2008, 160–76; Klinke 2013, 681-85; Lundborg 2011, 192; Stephens 2010, 34; Vij 
2012, 9). Many oppose the “linear time” of the clock and state with alternative concepts of 
time: “savage” or indigenous (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010, 190; Nanibush 2016, 105-07; 
Shaw 2008, 62), “private” and “women’s” (Kristeva, Jardine, and Blake 1981; Bryson 2007, 
121-44; see Glucksmann 1998, 242-43 and 251-53), embodied presence (Gallagher 2012, 
76–77), traumatic (Edkins 2003, 29-41; Ferreira and Marcelino 2011, 136), cyclical (Shaw 
2008, 110), “cross-stitched” (Solomon 2014, 671–74), and “traces” and micropolitical 
“immediacy” (Shapiro 2010, 39–42; Stephens 2010, 34).2 Others criticize how various 
theorists combine chronos (homogeneous flow) and kairos (moments of opportunity) to 
produce totalizing accounts of political time. Instead, these critics champion the potential of 
aion (virtual time) to recover political possibility from sovereign historical logics (Hutchings 
2008, 69; Lundborg 2011, 21). Taken together, these efforts direct attention away from 
hegemonic statist times toward the marginalized, oppressed, and otherwise forgotten times of 
                                                
2 For overviews, see Hom and Steele (2010, 274–78); Stevens (2015, 36–41); Walker (1993, 1–14). 
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global politics. They argue compellingly that time matters more – and in more ways – than 
conventional international-relations research allows. 
 
What’s the matter with time in the study of international relations? 
Thanks to these critical efforts, international-relations theory now possesses a much more 
expansive view of time. However, this vantage exposes three overriding problems. First, 
mainstream scholars working with time and critical scholars working on time do not speak 
much to each other. Relatedly, both groups habitually invoke the problem of time without 
unpacking or connecting it to other temporalities. The three ways that time matters, then, 
work like “stovepipes”, or particular knowledge channels isolated from one another. 
Stovepiping also occurs within critical international relations, where scholars show little 
interest in comparing or connecting their proliferating concepts of time to one another.  
 
Second, our discourse of time remains descriptive and parochial. International-relations 
research employs unexplained master concepts of time and qualifies these with unexplicated 
predicates. In terms of master concepts, in addition to clock and calendar time, scholars lean 
heavily on linear versus cyclical binaries (for example, Edkins 2003; Gallagher 2012; Hom 
and Steele 2010; Shaw 2008). Others develop Deleuzean adaptations of classical Greek 
thought into the aforementioned triad of chronos, kairos, and aion (Hutchings 2008, 154-
77).3 But none explain where these concepts originate or authorize the use of one instead of 
another, except by intuition or veneration. The field’s master concepts of time either make 
obvious sense or hark back to august thinkers. Both instances give the illusion of simply 
“nam[ing]” or “giv[ing] meaning to what is ‘out there’” (Berenskoetter 2017, 152; see also 
Guzzini 2013).4 They do not, however, explain “how time emerges and flows” (Blaney and 
Inayatullah 2010, 199; see also McIntosh 2015, 469, 485). 
 
Alternatively, scholars use creative but largely intuitive predicates to qualify “time” and 
“temporality”. Scholars invoke “temporal borders” (Lundborg 2016, 103-04; Walker 2009, 
31–35), “military techno-scientific time” (Gallagher 2012, 77), “now-time” and “city time” 
(Stephens 2010, 36, 42), or “timeless time” (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010, 190). One 
innovative cinematic analysis deploys “impossible,” “mobile,” “plastic,” and “critical” 
temporalities; “heterogeneous temporal association,” “temporal play,” the “event time” of 
                                                
3 Lundborg (2011, 16) uses chronos and aion but not kairos. 
4 Stevens (2015, 45–49) offers a rare exception. 
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bomb blasts, the “microtemporality” of intimacy, the “temporal trajectory for … moral 
damage,” and “documentary time” in a single chapter, with little to no explication (Shapiro 
2016, 36-52). The issue here is not temporal variety or creativity, but the absence of 
systematic elaboration or “predicate analyses” showing why these qualifiers ‘stick’ and 
“construct the thing(s) named as a particular sort of thing, with particular features and 
capacities” (Milliken 1999, 232). Indeed, the “temporal turn” (Berenskoetter 2011, 664) in 
critical international-relations theory works primarily through common-sense formulations. 
Intuitive concepts are useful but they also isolate a discursive community, obscure its broader 
symbolic order, and dilute its value to wider audiences.  
 
Third, efforts to understand time inadvertently end up reifying and obscuring their analytical 
objects. Critical scholars assert the contingent, socially constructed nature of time and 
criticize presumptive “ideas about some abstract unity” (Lundborg 2009; see also Edkins 
2003, 12; Hutchings 2008, 5; McIntosh 2015, 478; Solomon 2014, 671). Yet the way they 
discuss and theorize it reproduces a temporal imagination composed of natural, objective, or 
“thingy” entities possessing immutable essences and standing apart from human activity. For 
example, work deploying chronos, kairos, and aion slips from intersubjective temporal 
constructions into conflicts between free-standing times. It calls kairos a “creative force in its 
own right” that “intervenes” in chronos, which is “inscribed in the universe as a whole” 
(Hutchings 2008, 25 n.5, 31). It discusses how “time itself is captured by history” (Lundborg 
2011, 111–12). It claims that radical aion marks the “‘eternal truth of time: pure empty form 
of time’” (Hutchings 2008, 69). These remarks grant time a set of intrinsic and independent 
attributes divorced from human initiative.  
 
International-relations research broadly reflects this orientation to time “as an abstract 
historical actor” or “natural phenomenon with an essential nature” (Dudziak 2012, 3–4). 
Scholars proceed as if “time passes, irrespective of human desires and interventions” 
(Stevens 2015, 43–44). They insist that we respect “the fact that the passage of time, in and 
of itself, also shapes events” (Gaddis 1992, 38). Combined with the tendency to qualify it 
with intuitive predicates, these approaches reify and embed time as a pre-constituted object of 
knowledge—part of that “enigmatic treasure of ‘things’ anterior to discourse” (Foucault, 
quoted in Onuf 2012, 33). So even as scholars experiment with new ideas about time, they 
further entrench conventional habits treating time as innate, immutable, and mysterious (see 
McIntosh 2015, 470; Stevens 2015, 42–44). This highlights a theoretical disposition to 
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treating time as part of a “static” (Guzzini 2013, 534) or “substantialist” ontology of fixed 
entities (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 293–95). This disposition comports with some 
international-relations approaches but not with critical commitments to contingency and 
process (Edkins 2003, xiv–xv; Hutchings 2008, 30; see Jackson and Nexon 1999, 292). It 
also burnishes the ontological credentials of clock and calendar time, whose reliability and 
stability seem more “real” than other temporalities when assessed against criteria of stability 
and substantialness.  
 
Together these issues hamper research and undersell time’s importance. They strand 
international-relations scholars between a presumptive reliance on clock time, chronic but 
unreflective evocations of the problem of time, and a growing but woolly catalogue of 
alternative temporalities that inadvertently reaffirm a temporal hierarchy privileging the clock 
and calendar. This situation pervades the field and highlights the need for a different temporal 
vocabulary and theoretical approach, one that can complement and extend such efforts 
without reinforcing their shared tensions. In addition to a broader perspective on time, we 
need better theoretical leverage—a more rigorous and systematic means of analyzing it. This 
requires a deeper understanding of the basic processes that enable us to speak of time at all 
(see Lynch 2014, 42).5  
 
A matter of timing 
A straightforward but powerful shift provides a way forward. It involves moving from 
concepts and predicates of time to the dynamic, practical activity of timing. This approach 
draws on the sociologist Norbert Elias (1984, 111; 2007), who sought to analyze time as a 
theoretical and empirical puzzle rather than a philosophical enigma or physical entity. His 
approach reflects broader interests in process-relationalism (see Abbott 2001, 124; Jackson 
and Nexon 1999, 291-92; McCourt 2016, 475-76), and as such overlaps with well-known 
theories of time in that tradition. These include Bergson’s (1912, 55–56) account of 
experiential duration, Heidegger’s (2002, 12-20) formulation of pure occurrence from 
relations of appropriation, Whitehead’s (2004, 55, 34–35) interest in simultaneity amidst the 
ceaseless “passage of nature,” and Mead’s (2002, 73, 100-05) and James’ (see Andersen 
                                                
5 While embracing heterotemporality, I worry that absent elaboration, comparison, and dialogue, we 
risk blunting the temporal turn’s critical edge. Without such clarifications, incommensurability – the lack of a 
common measure – looks like full-blown incompatibility – the impossibility of being grasped together. This 
would call various times’ nominal affiliations into question. Temporal diversity makes systematic attention 
more important.  
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2014) accounts of the “specious” present constituted from emergence, novelty, and 
adjustment.  
 
However, there are good reasons to focus on Elias’ account of timing. Despite these theorists’ 
shared commitments to processes and relations, only Elias makes the dynamic verb “timing” 
a theoretical centerpiece. He does so precisely “to avoid [the] illusion” of time as a free-
standing entity (Elias 2007, 38). Other process-relational accounts work primarily with 
substantival nouns like duration, occurrence, simultaneity, and the present. This leaves them 
vulnerable to problems of reification and objectification.6 While all share affinities with 
timing and some nearly acknowledge it (for example, Whitehead 2004, 33–48), none 
explicitly features timing, as Elias does.7 Therefore, this section develops his ideas about 
timing into a more robust theoretical framework tailored for international-relations analysis. 
 
Elias (2007, 38–39) grounds timing in humans’ basic capacities for making connections: “the 
word ‘time’ … is a symbol of a relationship that a human group – that is, a group of beings 
biologically endowed with the capacity for memory and synthesis – establishes between two 
or more continua of change, one of which is used by it as a frame of reference or standard of 
measurement for the other (or others).” Timing standards help us integrate and coordinate 
otherwise discordant phenomena into an intelligible whole supporting orientation, direction, 
and control (Elias 2007, 43–44). For example, clocks produce consistent, enumerated 
intervals. We use these to relate happenings (“the first bomb went off at 2:49 pm”) and 
quantify the extent of experiences (“two explosions ripped through the sidelines of the race, 
12 seconds … apart” and led to “102 hours in pursuit of Marathon suspects,” Globe Staff 
2013). Elias’ (2007, 84) examples of timing standards include physical continua like celestial 
motion, seasonal variation, and other reliable or repetitive processes.  
 
How well this synthesis works determines whether timing proceeds actively or passively. 
Active timing requires conscious effort and remains open to contestation (Elias 2007, 41–42). 
It includes successful timing not yet ingrained as “second nature” or novel attempts to 
“redirect” the course of events, and may showcase a timing agent who proposes its standard 
                                                
6 Additionally, a full synthesis, comparing and translating these theories and detailing their 
implications for international-relations theorizing, exceeds this note’s remit. 
7 “Timing” does not occur in any works mentioned here, nor does it occur in international-relations 
work like Berenskoetter (2011); Solomon (2014); or Walker (1993). It appears incidentally in Hom (2010, 1156, 
1166); Hom and Steele (2010, 277); Hutchings (2008, 30–31); Lundborg (2011, 15); McIntosh (2015, 472, 
479), and enigmatically in Walker (2009, 131, 198, 252).  
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of synthesis. Passive timing requires little effort and “no decision” (Elias 2007, 43) – we have 
memorized and absorbed its operations and so conduct them subconsciously. Once again, 
clock-based timing exemplifies this. It has become second nature because people learn its 
standard easily and apply this widely, because industrialization made clocks cheaply 
available, and because imperialism, globalization, and war spread its rule around the world 
(see Hom 2010, 1153–70).  
 
Language provides the pivot by which timing explains “how time emerges or flows.” 
Symbolic discourse has a “figural” inclination toward “reifying substantives” rather than 
dynamic relations (Elias 2007, 35). Because timing deals with the latter, we find it easier to 
discuss using a “hypostatised” noun, time, whose attributes and predicates derive from the 
properties of the timing process (Elias 2007, 43, 61). Language’s “substantival” capacity 
thereby transmits learned knowledge about timing attempts, helping us avoid beginning anew 
but also objectifying and naturalizing “time” in the process of transmission (Elias 2007, 54, 
36). At the limit, our discourse evinces a “fetish-character”, encouraging such a 
comprehensive “process reduction” of timing as to make the noun “time” appear “self-
explanatory to people who have grown up with such language” (Elias 2007, 61). This 
obscures time’s verbal origin in timing and helps it pass as an independent entity.  
 
Whenever we encounter temporal references, then, we should treat them as timing 
indexicals—opportunities to discover underlying efforts to synthesize dynamic relations. 
“The end of history” (Fukuyama 2006) reflects no actual cessation of events. Rather, it 
communicates teleological hopes that recent events fulfilled the purposeful logic of 
international politics, which will now stabilize and endure. Revolutionaries proclaiming the 
“dawn of a new era” identify no natural breakpoint. Rather they propose to comprehensively 
re-time society by shifting responsibility from themselves to the seemingly independent 
dynamics of time. Think of the French Revolution’s Year One in 1792, or the Khmer 
Rouge’s Year Zero in 1975, both of which operationalized revolutionary timing programs 
through original calendars.  
 
The politics in timing 
Timing thus offers a more dynamic way to study temporal phenomena. Yet for all its 
innovation, Elias’ account remains skeletal and abstract. To bridge timing theory with 
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international-relations theorizing, we need to extend his ideas and elaborate their political 
aspects.  
 
First, a timing standard need not be natural or consistent. Narratives configure actors and 
situations by an unfolding gestalt (Carr 1986, 41–42); visions “pull the actor toward the 
future” (Berenskoetter 2011, 663); and even idiosyncratic routines imbue daily life with 
stability and normalcy (Steele 2008, 3).8 These ideographical examples all still work as 
timing standard because they offer some rule for establishing relations between dynamic 
continua. This accommodates a much wider range of phenomena as timing processes. 
 
Second, we can sketch a spectrum running from active to passive timing (see Figure 1, p. 
000). Key points include wholly unprecedented timing proposals, shared but effortful timing 
activities, habituated timing practices, and deeply embedded, passive timing regimes. For 
active timing to become more passive, it must confer increasing benefits of orientation, 
coordination, and control via the efficient transmission of working knowledge (Elias 2007, 
10). If it does, it may outlive its original purpose, becoming a self-propagating or “unowned 
process” (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 302) residing solely in the synthetic relations it routinizes 
and thereby seeming more natural.  
 
However, this spectrum is inherently unstable. Neither passive nor active timing ever ends 
conclusively. As dynamic processes, they remain provisional and occasionally fraught. In 
particular, novel changes pose timing challenges that may cause us to shift from passive to 
active timing to restore or completely reconfigure social relations.9 Consequently, references 
to the “fullness of time,” “end of history,” or some unassailable dimension have no absolute 
or proper content. Temporal utterances refer only to a host of ongoing active and passive 
timing efforts. 
 
                                                
8 For an extensive discussion of narrative timing, see Hom (n.d.). 
9 For how security politics manifests this passive-active timing shift, see Hom (2016, 169, 177–78). 
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Figure 1 
 
Third, substantival discourse serves an institutionalizing function. It helps successful timing 
modes become more passive and perhaps self-propagating by embedding their hypostatized 
symbols in discourse. It can thereby vivify time, subsuming a timing mode within a figural 
“time” endowed with agency and potency – as in the traditional problem of time as an 
overwhelming force or angry god.  
 
These extensions of timing hold important political implications (see Figure 2, p. 000). Take 
the aforementioned timing standards of clockwork motion, narrative themes, and future 
visions, which integrate discordant phenomena. The clock pervades modern life, stories 
confront heroes with villains, and visions lead us into unexpected encounters. To establish 
these non-spontaneous relations, timing imposes connections. If changes coordinated 
naturally, creative synthesis would be unnecessary—we would not need to time. But in 
situations lacking such coordination, timing depends on either “the readiness of [a] plurality 
to submit to an integrating authority” (Elias 2007, 136) or that authority’s ability to enforce 
its timing proposal. Put differently, timing establishes relations by realizing some “will to 
power” (Nietzsche 1982, 225–28) or, better, a will to time. It marks a creative effort to turn a 
dynamic welter into a coherent situation, to unfold a meaningful world within the flux of 
experience. Therefore, “time” not only symbolizes relational processes, it also instantiates, 
communicates, and embeds a temporal politics.  
  12 
  
Finally, timing is positional: “people of a particular reference group” (Elias 2007, 61) 
undertake timing efforts that reflect their distinctive relationship to the wider world. In 
critical parlance, timing – like theory (Cox 1981, 128) – always works for someone and some 
purpose. As it becomes self-propagating and deeply ingrained, timing turns imperial, 
bringing more and more groups under its standard. Critical discussions of “hegemonic” times 
allude to this. Yet because timing is intrinsically provisional and non-exhaustive, every 
temporal reference—whether dominant or dissident, general or idiosyncratic—reflects a 
position and a will to time that privileges and marginalizes, elevates and subordinates agents 
and processes at the same “time”.  
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Why timing matters 
Timing theory confers important benefits to international-relations scholars engaging with 
time. In addition to foregrounding process in discussions of intrinsically dynamic 
phenomena, it resolves issues of reification, master concepts, and stovepiping. Scholars 
working with predicated time and temporality effectively begin their story in the middle and 
work toward the end by layering up abstraction and complexity. This locks in time as a stand-
alone entity, leaving us ensconced within the very symbolic discourse that conceals its roots. 
By contrast, timing theory locates time and temporality not as “ontological primitives” 
(Jackson and Nexon 1999, 291–92, 318) but as timing outcomes. We start from the 
beginning, when dynamic relation-building efforts meet some instrumental need and produce 
a time or temporality only by succeeding enough to stimulate intersubjective discourse. This 
historicizes every temporal reference, highlights our choice to treat such references as 
“analytically autonomous,” and inhibits our tendency to conflate this choice with an 
independent existence (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 295). By resisting reification, timing theory 
also sharpens challenges to hegemonic time. Instead of deploying purportedly critical 
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concepts of time that inadvertently reaffirm clock or state time as more real, timing theory 
makes a strong claim for timing all the way down: every time and temporality contains a 
practical and conceptual history based exclusively in contingent and provisional efforts to 
establish relations between dynamic changes.  
 
Timing theory further enables scholars to explain the prevalence of master concepts and 
intuitive predicates as an effect of their practical value for transmitting knowledge about 
underlying relational processes. The power of linear and cyclical times does not stem from 
anything natural or innate. Rather, it reflects their metaphorical capacity, passed down over 
generations, to quickly and effectively communicate timing methods. Nor must we accept 
that chronos describes a universal time, kairos a spontaneous moment of opportunity, or aion 
any eternal truth. Instead, these ideas index basic timing issues. Aion signifies a situation in 
need of timing and full of possibilities – a dynamic bramble open to different modes of 
synthesis. The chosen mode enables kairotic, active timing, which, if widely repeated, may 
become a more passive, chronotic regime eventually conflated with time per se until some 
novel change exposes different, aionic possibilities. 
 
Timing theory also helps us avoid stovepiping. It allows us to scrutinize the common 
constituents of various times: their timing standard, the active or passive qualities of their 
modes of synthesis, what will to time they reflect, their positionality, and how symbolic 
language transmits and subsumes all of these (see Figure 2, p. 000). It is a theoretical problem 
that international-relations scholars neglect this sort of systematic approach to time. Their 
oversight reinforces the sense of time as naturally enigmatic and establishes the description of 
temporal variety as the upper limits of analysis. It is also a phenomenological problem. By 
reifying stovepipes scholars make it seem as if the world just is full of incompatible times 
that may constrain and isolate different social groups – as when modern imaginaries assign 
indigenous tribes a place “out of time” (see Blaney and Inayatullah 2010, 17; Nanibush 2016, 
106). From the vantage of timing theory, this conclusion looks premature at best. We might 
instead read temporal variation as different ways of grappling with shared functional 
challenges. We might also view social agents as enmeshed in multiple, layered, and 
interpenetrating timing efforts. Depending on positionality and political power, different 
timing modes wax and wane. In some instances individuals or groups set their own standards, 
but in others hegemonic timing regimes like the unilinear-progressive pull of development 
benchmarks predominate (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010, 190–91). Either way, no one ever 
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stands “outside time” as such. Just the opposite, we are always timing and being timed—
usually in multiple ways. Scholars can and should elaborate this. We might begin by charting 
various times but we should also take further steps to explain why the same group adopts or 
submits to different timing regimes, how one regime supplants another, or why certain timing 
modes adhere to geographical, anthropological, gender, and other political distinctions.  
 
Explaining the times of international-relations theory 
Consider our three primary ways that time matters. Behind the clock’s “real” time we find 
neither eternal motion nor neutral medium but rather a modern political achievement. Clock 
time sprang from multigenerational efforts to integrate and coordinate various groups and 
processes by increasingly reliable mechanical motion (see Hom 2010, 1153–65). This 
resulted in a widely applicable timing regime reflecting the operational value of 
quantification and repetition (Elias 2007, 39). Clock timing encourages self-propagation, 
passive institutionalization, and ultimately arch-reification in symbolic language. It 
dominates contemporary life and consequently gets apprehended as time per se.  
 
This explanation holds important implications for any time deemed more real than others. 
Where critical approaches distinguish temporal experience from objective time (for example, 
Lundborg 2016, 101; Solomon 2014, 674 n.4; for contrast see Hutchings 2008, 5),10 timing 
theory offers a stronger critical option. It denies any “real” time’s ontological superiority by 
providing a sociopolitical explanation for its ascendance. Objective times spring from the 
same sources as subjective temporalities: practical and contingent timing efforts. They only 
come to seem “objective” by virtue of institutionalization, self-propagation, and symbolic 
reification. And yet precisely because they are neither given nor natural, hegemonic times 
also mark timing achievements—the ascendance of some will to time and mode of synthesis 
over others and the voluntary or forced submission of an especially large plurality. By 
injecting sociopolitical elements into previously unassailable times, timing theory upends a 
longstanding conceptual hierarchy. It historicizes and indeed politicizes those times often 
thought beyond human experience without obviating their theoretical or practical value.11 
 
                                                
10 Although meant to legitimate subjective experience, this moves follows philosophy in reaffirming a 
“time” beyond mere temporal experience, which reinforces our dominant symbolic order.  
11 This does not mean we can simply change time by describing it differently. “Time” and its predicates 
transmit effective timing knowledge, so shared meanings and practical demands confront efforts to challenge or 
get outside a dominant timing mode. In international relations “time” often reflects large-scale social projects, 
which amplify these linguistic constraints.  
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Or take the problem of time. Much as we speak of “time passing” when timing proceeds so 
passively that our life and environment seem utterly congruous (Elias 2007, 61),12 we also 
say that time “devours” or “threatens us.” The difference is that problematic symbols of time 
characterize timing challenges (Elias 2007, 35–36). We derive the attributes of these symbols 
from dynamic environments highly resistant to synthetic relations. Referencing time as a 
problem announces a failed or failing timing project (Elias 2007, 109, 43), creating a 
temporal entity and blaming it for incoherent or de-cohering relational processes.  
 
Early complex societies depended on agriculture, tax collection, religious rites, and other 
large-scale coordination efforts (Elias 2007, 21–22, 48). These massive, active timing 
projects proved exceedingly challenging. Not surprisingly, the problem of time emerged early 
in those societies’ symbolic systems (Brandon 1965, 39–46; Gunnell 1987, 14). Once 
discursively embedded, the problem of time offers us a way to subsume confounding 
experiences with timing.13 It thereby communicates the basic truth that survival depends upon 
contingent and provisional acts of timing. This explains the otherwise paradoxical 
relationship between the problem of time and less threatening “concepts of time and history, 
[by which] man gains control over … ‘time’ in the sense of flux” (Gunnell 1987, 23, 
emphasis added). When timing proves difficult, we characterize time as a problematic force 
and propose solutions through manageable, passive abstractions conducive to successful 
timing.  
	
Finally, take heterotemporality. Along with facilitating a more systematic account of 
temporal variety, timing theory places heterotemporality on firmer empirical footing: if 
everyone times in one way or another, if every time symbolizes a timing mode, and if we take 
seriously the temporal variation critical scholars identify, then time as such is baseline 
heterotemporal. Consequently, hegemonic, unitary variants like clock time mark deviations 
from the norm. This point moves beyond other critical approaches, which eschew talk of time 
per se because this suggests some presupposed, unitary time (Hutchings 2008, 4; Lundborg 
2009; Shapiro 2016, 50). In timing theory, however, when we speak of “time as such” this 
implies no spurious unity but instead a totality-in-multiplicity of all the timing practices that 
humans undertake. We cannot reduce time as such to any philosophically or conceptually 
                                                
12 Elias (2007, 36) notes that “time passing” works like “river flowing” or “wind blowing”—subject 
and predicate refer to the same process. 
13 Because timing never ends, the problem of time persists even as successful timing produces tame 
abstractions of “time.” 
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unitary account because this would possess no content—it would not reference a 
comprehensive and conclusive timing practice. This repositions heterotemporality as not only 
a critical resource but also a criterion of social-scientific adequacy: international-relations 
scholars must accommodate or at least acknowledge a multitude of timing practices; those 
presumptively employing clock and calendar time or statist historical frames must justify 
their choice to delimit temporal factors and then reflect on its explanatory and political 
implications (see McIntosh 2015, 476–83). 
 
The power of timing theory 
To be clear, timing theory lodges a competitive claim against other temporal approaches. It 
proffers a means of speaking and thinking more suitable for temporal analysis than extant 
alternatives, which remain inside their phenomena of interest in ways that obscure deeper 
understanding. It avoids reproducing distinctions between objective time and subjective 
temporality as well as the problematic tendencies of both mainstream and critical discourses. 
It coherently elaborates and connects the ways that time matters in international-relations 
research where other approaches cannot. And it offers a more thoroughgoing critical 
approach to time. Put differently, timing theory “liberates” mainstream and critical scholars 
from “the limits of [their own] representation” (Lundborg 2009). 
 
Understood heuristically, timing theory also achieves superior explanatory value. A heuristic 
framework develops “thematic” content that suggests empirical focus, shapes inquiry, and 
guides explanations (Humphreys 2011, 258). It aims not for testable hypotheses but to 
organize inquiry “systematically, structure questions and establish a coherent and rigorous set 
of interrelated concepts and categories” (Buzan 2010, 24). Its explanatory payoff consists not 
of causal laws or predictable generalizations but the pragmatic benefits of a more useful 
ordering of experience (Jackson 2011, 124).  
 
Timing theory offers a thematic account of how times and temporalities emerge from 
practical processes via symbolic discourse. Timing indexicals direct our empirical focus, 
while the timing standard, the will to time, positionality, and distinctions between active and 
passive timing further shape our inquiry. These elements guide the questions we ask and 
therefore the explanations we develop: What knowledge of practical efforts to establish 
dynamic relations does “time” or “temporality” transmit? Does its underlying timing mode 
proceed more actively or passively? Who or what purpose does it serve? By what standard 
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and means of synthesis does it achieve orientation, direction, and control? How does it 
accommodate novel change? How does it compare and compete with other timing efforts? 
Taken together, these themes and questions organize temporal inquiry systematically and 
rigorously and thus facilitate a more useful ordering of temporal experience that is also more 
straightforward than other approaches (Elias 1984, 111).  
 
Timing theory and international relations 
Beyond clarifying scholars’ engagements with time, timing theory can add value to core 
areas of international-relations research, like war and identity. Although references to “times 
of war” date back at least to the Torah (see Eccl. 3:1), research on war largely overlooks 
temporal issues (although see Dudziak 2012; McIntosh 2015, 478-83).14 Yet the prevalence 
of timing indexicals like “wartime” and the “chaos” of war suggest that timing matters in war 
more than we realize. 
 
“Wartime” indicates an attempt to synthesize political relations by violent means. It emerges 
when belligerents actively try to direct and control each other according to mutually 
incompatible timing standards. What ideas provide these competing wartiming standards? 
Consider victory, the highly contested end states that belligerents seek.15 Notions of victory 
specify outcomes and indicate how they might unfold from extant situations. They thus 
construct a rationale for initiating war, a guide to prosecuting it, and a benchmark for 
concluding and assessing it. 
 
How does timing constitute war and help explain its outcome? In the case of the Vietnam 
War, timing clashes were crucial. It exemplified a war fought “with time, … time itself [w]as 
a strategic asset … the ‘ultimate weapon’ of the Revolution, as well as the ‘final guarantor of 
victory’” (Nguyen 2008, 377).16 American war planners assumed that the National Liberation 
Front (NLF) could not weather an extended conflict, either economically or militarily. 
However, the NLF prolonged the war and weakened American resolve by creatively retiming 
the social relations of its personnel. It adapted “free” or “leisure time”—long the domain of 
community events and religious rites—to the needs of small fighting units of young men 
                                                
14 Long-cycles research seems an exception but falls in our first category of how time matters, treating 
time as a freestanding dimension along which power fluctuates (for example, Goldstein 1988, 7). 
15 Conspicuously, war studies also overlooks the meaning of victory (see O’Driscoll 2015, 808–10), 
despite its signal importance. 
16 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this example. 
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newly separated from their communities and families. “‘The lives of the Revolution’s 
soldiers intertwined constantly, and as a total experience the army involved as many of their 
needs as was possible’” through a “comprehensive procedure of social reprogramming … 
designed to transform the ‘entire pattern’ of behavior of the new recruit” (Nguyen 2008, 
385–86, emphasis added). This reflected a “complete reorientation of individual aims and 
objectives … toward the achievement of military, administrative, and political ‘competence’” 
(Nguyen 2008, 391, emphasis added). Reprogramming covered cooking, military drill, 
education, administrative training, and extensive self-criticism sessions. The latter, kieˆ’m tha’o, 
suspended “the ‘reality’ of class and kinship,” allowing small groups to engage as equals in 
reflexive dialogue (Nguyen 2008, 389). These new activities constituted fighting units as 
“artificial families” and imbued them with the egalitarian, communist principles the NLF 
expected to implement after the war (Nguyen 2008, 385). The revolution trained its soldiers 
to live as if they had already won. 	
 
A strategic NLF priority, then, was to establish a radically different timing regime reflecting 
its vision of victory. The kieˆ’m tha’o in particular clarifies timing’s value. It “reorganiz[ed]” 
community and kinship practices toward “the construction of ‘situations,’ in which passive 
subjects and spectators transformed into participants”, who established “an ‘artificial’ set of 
relations” constitutive of unit cohesion and revolutionary identity (Nguyen 2008, 393, 
emphasis added). The way the kieˆ’m tha’o unfolded as part of the NLF’s daily rhythms 
exemplifies thematic hallmarks of timing. It arose from the NLF’s will to time revolutionary 
life differently—to establish new “rules of conduct and behavior”—and it “suspend[ed] and 
suppress[ed]” alternatives for the sake of social direction and control (Nguyen 2008, 384–
85). These new procedures produced better unit cohesion by prescribing lengthy activity 
chains in between brief periods of combat. This allowed the NLF to retard its operational 
pace. A protracted conflict confounded American leaders’ expectations and desires for a 
quick war and inhibited public support.  
 
The Vietnam War developed as a timing contest. On one side, a capitalist, democratic 
superpower whose war effort depended on consumption, surplus, and public support—all of 
which favored a quick outcome achieved through the constant application of dominant force 
(Nguyen 2008, 376–77). On the other, a revolutionary insurgency advantaged primarily in 
population, which comprehensively re-timed the lives of its personnel toward the rhythms of 
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a drawn-out war designed to sidestep America’s military dominance and sap its political will. 
The NLF’s mode of wartiming comported with its environmental and strategic constraints as 
well as its vision of victory. US wartiming, designed primarily for large-scale armored 
clashes in central Europe, did not.17 
 
Finally, how does wartiming accommodate novel change? All too well if we want to limit 
war. American leaders possessed fluid notions about victory in the Vietnam war. This 
ambiguity allowed the US military to “float” measures of success using opportunistic data 
like body counts rather than indicators derived from a coherent strategic vision (Daddis 2011, 
7). As facts on the ground evolved, so did America’s wartiming standard. It moved from 
propping up a ‘domino’ to pursuing ‘peace with honor’. Such flexible standards made it 
increasingly difficult to withdraw from an intervention turned quagmire. Three decades later, 
American commitments to “enduring freedom” foundered in the failed interventions in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, counterterrorism wars persist via ad hoc commitments to 
“degrade and destroy” or “bomb the hell out of” new actors sprung from the ruins of old 
failures. The war on terror never included an intelligible definition of victory that could 
provide an effective standard for initiating, conducting, and concluding military 
engagements. Meanwhile, evolving security logics and technologies offer increasingly 
adaptive modes of violent synthesis. Together these help counterterrorism war become a self-
propagating political timing practice, transforming discrete moments of terror into a 
continuous ‘time of peril’ defined by mission creep and a continuous war footing. By 
foregrounding the causal importance of victory and timing modes, timing extends our 
theoretical horizon of war. In cases like Vietnam, it raises the additional possibility of 
analyzing war itself as a timing contest. 
 
Timing theory can also extend identity research. Consider works that emphasize how 
selfhood emerges “in” and must be secured “through” or “over time” (for example,  
Berenskoetter 2011, 648; Solomon 2014, 671; Steele 2008, 56–64). Ontological security 
                                                
17 Nguyen does not discuss timing per se, although comments about the “quality” and “form” of NLF 
time mark conspicuous timing indexicals (378). He works with already-substantivized times: namely 
“disposable” or “superfluous” (377, 384), “unlimited” (384), artificial and natural (393). Individually, none of 
these poses problems if we readily grasp Marxist temporal predicates. Taken together, they produce strange 
formulations of key NLF innovations, such as the “diversion” of “superfluous time” or “wast[ing] free time” in 
“infinite amounts” (378, 383). Yet these innovations made the periods between combat indispensable to the 
revolutionary effort rather than disposable, highlighting discursive traps set by reified master concepts of time 
that are impertinent to new situations. Timing theory and the idea of re-timing avoids this, encouraging 
comparative and dynamic rather than reductive and static analysis.  
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theorists posit that social agents maintain identity by self-reflexively monitoring actions vis-
à-vis autobiographical narratives (Steele 2008, 17–18). Critical psychoanalytic researchers 
stress the “desire” for identity stability, derived from “the subject’s ‘lack’—of never fully 
being temporally or discursively present” and expressed through “identification practices” 
like robust “fantasy” and retroactive meaning-making (Solomon 2014, 672–77). 
Poststructuralists argue that “encircling” traumatic events preserves their original 
unintelligibility and prevents political subjects from being “re-inscribed,” 
“remembered/forgotten,” and “normalised” in “linear” state narratives, which “claim” such 
betrayals as heroic, necessary sacrifices (Edkins 2003, 95, 9).  
 
These literatures foreground the importance of time but locate social selves apart from it. 
They tend to understand identity as a process that must cohere over time, confront its 
destabilizing essence, or disrupt its linear strictures. These characterizations offer up timing 
indexicals, the “tells” suggestive of underlying timing practices. Indeed, we can usefully 
reformulate these accounts. Instead of exploring how identity emerges “in time,” to be 
secured “over” or “through” it, we can explore how identity itself constitutes a timing project, 
an effort to synthesize oneself out of or with a variety of experiences, environmental changes, 
and other timing agents. Core identity commitments provide the timing standard (Hom and 
Solomon 2016, 24), often couched in terms of a dominant role or the main theme of a self’s 
autobiography (Carr 1986, 75–78). This standard tells us how to relate to others and how to 
negotiate dynamic and novel situations in order to (re)produce not only a coherent sense of 
self but a stable sense of time—a notion that our dynamic world is unfolding manageably 
(see Hom and Solomon 2016, 26–27; Edkins 2003, 4; Pratt 2017, 78). “Temporally 
decentered” social agents “stitch” across different times precisely because they labor to time 
their selves (Solomon 2014, 671–75). When successful, they gain not only a temporary sense 
of wholeness but also of “being present” (Solomon 2014, 675), of holding tenable 
connections to a “durable social arrangement” (Pratt 2017, 81; Elias 2007, 31).  
 
Who we think we are is inextricably bound up with when we think we are. Discussions of 
identity “through” or “over” time obscure this all too easily because they implicitly frame 
time as the pre-constituted ground for identity construction. Timing offers us a more fraught 
picture of identity than critical and constructivist accounts. An insecure sense of self 
produces anxiety, but unanswered questions about that self’s relationship with its broader 
environment—or that environment’s cohesiveness—disturb us even more thoroughly. To 
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assuage our anxieties about both identity and time, we require not only self-consistent action 
but also the constant, laborious work of synthesizing an intelligible temporal whole from a 
welter of changes. This is a matter of sheer process-relational workload. The subject’s 
incompleteness or “lack” reflects the timing demand of constantly relating oneself to a 
dynamic environment. Similarly, shame, critical situations (Steele 2008, 12–13), and trauma 
denote timing breakdowns—instances when our constitutive relations dissolve or produce 
such “a mismatch between expectation and event” as to announce a rupture and unspeakable 
“betrayal” (Edkins 2003, 8–9). By focusing on the timing self instead of identity in or 
through time, we recover these intrinsic links and tensions between social selves and the 
“broader transactional context[s], out of which actors and their worlds emerge” (Pratt 2017, 
83, emphasis added).  
 
Timing theory’s resistance to intuitive but limited master concepts further sharpens the 
critical edge of identity research. For example, Jenny Edkins’ account of state time vs. trauma 
time deploys a familiar linear-cyclical binary. The nation-state partakes of linear time, which 
“gentrifies” and “depoliticises” traumatic experience in a settled story of heroic sacrifice 
(Edkins 2003, 15). Resisting this sovereign power involves “encircling the trauma … ‘again 
and again’” to “surround” its “absence,” prevent its reinscription in “linear time,” and 
ultimately leave “open a space for a genuine political challenge” (Edkins 2003, 15–16).  
 
Edkins’ dependence on this master temporal binary limits her otherwise compelling analysis. 
It makes linear time seem like the primary source of sovereign power and continuity (Edkins 
2003, 95). This in turn invests encirclement with radical appeal. Yet Edkins overlooks the 
stabilizing and pacifying potential of cyclical temporalities (see Gunnell 1987, 110–24). 
Alongside heroic histories, states also synthesize collective identity with calendrical cycles 
(Callahan 2006, 397; Hom 2017, 447), which dictate work and leisure patterns and set 
national holidays for particular historical events. Combined with clock-based notions of 
efficiency and punctuality (see O’Malley 1990, 145–48), calendrical cycles provide a passive 
and self-propagating timing regime that unfolds the life and times of the nation. Moreover, 
“returning” to traumatic sites “again and again” might keep their meaning unsettled. But 
return might also become a routine in its own rite, a custom absorbing trauma survivors in a 
normalized rhythm that becomes a form of silence rather than political voice.  
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For example, for several years the town of Royal Wootton Bassett (RWB) witnessed 
processions of returning dead British military personnel. This included no fanfare, few overt 
displays of nationalism, and staunch resistance to wider publicity (see Whetham 2017, 183–
86). Instead, councilors stopped the town clock from tolling and residents somberly observed 
the passing of state corpses (Whetham 2017, 178). Witnesses and grieving families at RWB 
thus encircled the traumas and surrounded the absences caused by British military 
intervention again and again. Yet by becoming part of RWB’s daily life and rebuffing 
explicit politicization, they also gentrified trauma in a sense. Their silent witness became part 
of the rhythm of low-intensity war-fighting. Thus RWB’s cyclical practices reinforced 
sovereign state timing, not through heroic narrative but by routinizing traumatic loss as a 
quotidian quotient of British identity. This episode reinforces the fact that states time citizens 
in a variety of ways—linear, cyclical, and otherwise. This makes resistance very difficult but 
not impossible. It also suggests that we move beyond binary metaphors to better explore 
trauma’s active potential to disrupt the state’s multifaceted, passive timing regimes without 
risking self-pacification. As with war, timing theory enriches our understanding of trauma 
and identity by exposing their constitutive links to timing practices and conflicts. 
 
Conclusion 
International-relations theory today benefits from a more expansive view of time, but the 
field remains constrained by habits that undermine its analysis of time and undersell time’s 
importance to international politics. Timing theory helps resolve these issues. Its dynamic 
framework—based in practical, processual, and political relations rather than given and static 
concepts—provides a better way to explain time’s emergence and operation. Timing offers 
heuristic resources for developing rigorous and systematic accounts of temporal phenomena. 
And it augments our knowledge of core issues like war and identity, showing how they often 
hinge on matters of timing. 
 
Additionally, timing theory can imbue three emerging international-relations research areas 
with dynamism and contingency. First, as noted, pragmatist accounts of social life show how 
various processes and forms of relations produce the ‘stuff’ of international politics (Avant 
2006, 515-20; 2016, 330-33; Goddard 2009, 250; Jackson and Nexon 1999, 313-17; McCourt 
2016, 481). However, much of this work emphasizes relations over processes. We can see 
this in the prevalence of network analysis, a spatial and somewhat static brand of process-
relationalism (see McCourt 2016, 480). Timing theory helps us put the process back in these 
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relations by highlighting their fluidity, provisionality, and dependence on willful effort. 
Moreover, the active-passive timing spectrum can help us clarify how relational processes 
become institutionalized or sediment into visualizable networks. 
 
Second, historical sociological work applies Elias’s ideas to long-term developments (for 
example, Górnicka, Liston, and Mennell 2015; Heinrich 2013; Linklater 2016; Towns 2009, 
692-99) and to key international-relations concepts (Lacassagne 2012; Wickham and Evers 
2012). This literature barely addresses Elias’ ideas about timing. So while it foregrounds the 
diachronic sense of things changing “over time”, it cannot draw out the causal or constitutive 
sense of how temporal factors drive political outcomes.18  
 
Third, timing theory joins interpretivist efforts to accommodate the “fundamental 
temporality” of social life. But, importantly, it does so without the roundabout moves of 
detaching meanings from practices, objectifying them, and then “historicizing” them, all so 
they “lose their temporality and locality” to become legitimate analytical objects (Pouliot 
2007, 366–68). Timing theory works much more directly. It allows scholars to dig beneath 
timing indexicals to discover relation-building efforts and their practical and symbolic 
history. This brings history and theory together, constructing a dynamic theory of times from 
the pragmatic genealogies of various temporal symbols. 
 
Timing theory thereby problematizes deeply entrenched habits of speaking and thinking 
about time and begins to reconstruct our temporal imagination. Earlier I scrutinized analyses 
of identity “over/in/through” time. Timing theory’s emphasis on positionality and will 
encourages scholars to pay this sort of attention to all such temporal claims. This opens up 
wide-ranging subfields like historical institutionalism, longitudinal statistics, and the English 
School to questions about what assumptions and perspectives inform our analytical 
deployments of “time.”  
 
Finally, timing theory broaches the self-reflexive move of treating international-relations 
theories and explanations as efforts to re-time politics, replete with underlying timing 
standards, wills to time, and particular positions and purposes.19 This marks the first step 
toward working through the idea of international-relations as a political timing project in its 
                                                
18 Similarly, discussions of Elias’ work on timing ignore politics (for example, Tabboni 2001). 
19 For example, see Hom (2016, 176–78; 2017, 450–52). 
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own right—a collection of efforts to render change continua intelligible, establish relations 
between them, and anticipate how they can and should unfold. That is, timing helps clarify 
and connect the many times of international political practice and theory, while also calling 
for a disclosure of our own disciplinary timing commitments.  
 
  25 
 
References   
 
ABBOTT, ANDREW. 2001. Time Matters: On Theory and Method. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
AGATHANGELOU, ANNA M. AND KYLE D. KILLIAN. 2016. "Introduction: Of Time and 
Temporality in World Politics." In Time, Temporality and Violence in International 
Relations: (De)fatalizing the Present, Forging Radical Alternatives, edited by Anna 
M. Agathangelou and Kyle D. Killian, 1-22. Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge. 
ANDERSEN, HOLLY. 2014. "The Development of the 'Specious Present' and James's Views on 
Temporal Experience." In Subjective Time: The Philosophy, Psychology, and 
Neuroscience of Temporality, edited by Valtteri Arstila and Dan Lloyd, 25-42. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
ANDERSON, LISA. 2011. "Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences between 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya." Foreign Affairs 90: 2–7. 
AVANT, DEBORAH. 2006. "The Implications of Marketized Security for IR Theory: The 
Democratic Peace, Late State Building, and the Nature and Frequency of Conflict." 
Perspectives on Politics 4: 507-528. 
AVANT, DEBORAH. 2016. "Pragmatic Networks and Transnational Governance of Private 
Military and Security Services." International Studies Quarterly 60: 507-528. 
BACZYNSKA, GABRIELA. 2014. "Crimea Switches to Moscow Time amid Incorporation 
Frenzy." Reuters, March 29. (Accessed September 18, 2017) 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-crimea-time/crimea-switches-to-
moscow-time-amid-incorporation-frenzy-idUSBREA2S0LT20140329. 
BECK, NATHANIEL, JONATHAN N. KATZ, and RICHARD TUCKER. 1998. "Taking Time 
Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable." 
American Journal of Political Science 42: 1260–1288. 
BERENSKOETTER, FELIX. 2017. "Approaches to Concept Analysis." Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 45: 151–73. 
BERENSKOETTER, FELIX. 2011. "Reclaiming the Vision Thing: Constructivists as Students of 
the Future." International Studies Quarterly 55: 647–68. 
BERGSON, HENRI. 1912. The Introduction to a New Philosophy: Introduction à La 
Métaphysique. Boston, MA: J.W. Luce and Company. 
BLANEY, DAVID L., and NAEEM INAYATULLAH. 2010. Savage Economics: Wealth, Poverty 
and the Temporal Walls of Capitalism. Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge. 
BOX-STEFFENSMEIER, JANET M., JOHN R. FREEMAN, MATTHEW P. HITT, AND JON C. W. 
PEVEHOUSE. 2014. Time Series Analysis for the Social Sciences. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press. 
  26 
BOX-STEFFENSMEIER, JANET M., and BRADFORD S. JONES. 1997. "Time Is of the Essence: 
Event History Models in Political Science." American Journal of Political Science 41: 
1414–1461. 
BRANDON, S.G.F. 1965. History, Time, and Deity. Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University 
Press. 
BRYSON, VALERIE. 2007. Gender and the Politics of Time: Feminist Theory and 
Contemporary Debates. Bristol, U.K.: Policy Press. 
BUZAN, BARRY. 2010. From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the 
Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 
ÇALKIVIK, ASLI. 2016. "Killing Time: Writing the Temporality of Global Politics." In Time, 
Temporality and Violence in International Relations: (De)fatalizing the Present, 
Forging Radical Alternatives, edited by Anna M. Agathangelou and Kyle D. Killian, 
233-245. Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge. 
CALLAHAN, WILLIAM A. 2006. "War, Shame, and Time: Pastoral Governance and National 
Identity in England and America." International Studies Quarterly 50: 395–419. 
CARR, DAVID. 1986. Time, Narrative, and History. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press. 
COX, ROBERT. 1981. "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relations Theory." Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10: 126–55. 
DADDIS, GREGORY A. 2011. No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and 
Progress in the Vietnam War. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
DUDZIAK, MARY L. 2012. War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
EDKINS, JENNY. 2003. Trauma and the Memory of Politics. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
ELIAS, NORBERT. 2007. An Essay on Time. Dublin, IR: University College Dublin Press. 
ELIAS, NORBERT. 1984. What Is Sociology? New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
FERREIRA, MARIA JOÃO, and PEDRO F. MARCELINO. 2011. "Politics in Trauma Times: Of 
Subjectivity, War, and Humanitarian Intervention." Ethics & Global Politics 4: 135–
45. 
FUKUYAMA, FRANCIS. 2006. The End of History and the Last Man. New York, NY: Avon 
Books. 
GADDIS, JOHN LEWIS. 1992. "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War." 
International Security 17: 5–58. 
GALLAGHER, BRIANNE. 2012. "Coming Home: The Temporal Presence of the U.S. Soldier’s 
Wounded Body." In The New Violent Cartography: Geo-Analysis after the Aesthetic 
  27 
Turn, edited by Sam Okoth Opondo and Michael J. Shapiro, 69-89. Abingdon, U.K.: 
Routledge. 
GLOBE STAFF. 2013. "102 Hours in Pursuit of Marathon Bombing Suspects." The Boston 
Globe, April 28. (Accessed April 13, 2017). 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/04/28/bombreconstruct/VbSZhzHm35yR8
8EVmVdbDM/story.html.  
GODDARD, STACIE. 2009. "Brokering Change: Networks and Entrepreneurs in International 
Politics." International Theory 1: 249-281. 
GOLDSTEIN, JOSHUA S. 1988. Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
GÓRNICKA, BARBARA, KATIE LISTON, and STEPHEN MENNELL. 2015. "Twenty-five years on: 
Norbert Elias's Intellectual Legacy 1990-2015." Human Figurations 4 (3). (Accessed 
November 30, 2017). http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.11217607.0004.303. 
GLUCKSMANN, MIRIAM A. 1998. "'What a Difference a Day Makes': A Theoretical and 
Historical Exploration of Temporality and Gender." Sociology 32: 239-258. 
GUNNELL, JOHN G. 1987. Political Philosophy and Time: Plato and the Origins of Political 
Vision. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
GUZZINI, STEFANO. 2013. "The Ends of International Relations Theory: Stages of Reflexivity 
and Modes of Theorizing." European Journal of International Relations 19: 521–41. 
HANRIEDER, TINE. 2015. International Organization in Time: Fragmentation and Reform. 
Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. 
HEIDEGGER, MARTIN. 2002. On Time and Being. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
HEINRICH, NATHALIE. 2013. "Sublimating Resentment: Following Elias along Five Paths 
toward Another Sociology." Human Figurations 2 (3). (Accessed November 30, 
2017). http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.11217607.0002.302. 
HESFORD, VICTORIA, and LISA DIEDRICH. 2010. "Introduction: Thinking Feminism in a Time 
of War." In Feminist Time Against Nation Time: Gender, Politics, and the Nation-
State in an Age of Permanent War, edited by Victoria Hesford and Lisa Diedrich, 1-
22. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
HOM, ANDREW R. 2017. "Patriots All Around: Inter/National Timing, Round Numbers, and 
the Politics of Commemorative Critique." Australian Journal of Politics & History 
63: 442–55. 
HOM, ANDREW R. 2016. "Angst Springs Eternal: Dangerous Times and the Dangers of 
Timing the ‘Arab Spring.’" Security Dialogue 47: 165–83. 
HOM, ANDREW R. 2010. "Hegemonic Metronome: The Ascendancy of Western Standard 
Time." Review of International Studies 36: 1145–1170. 
  28 
HOM, ANDREW R. N.D. Reckoning Ruin: International Relations and the Problem of Time. 
Edinburgh. Book manuscript in preparation. 
HOM, ANDREW R., and TY SOLOMON. 2016. "Timing, Identity, and Emotion in International 
Relations." In Time, Temporality, and Global Politics, edited by Andrew R. Hom, 
Christopher McIntosh, Alasdair McKay, and Liam P.D. Stockdale, 20-37. Bristol, 
U.K.: e-International Relations. 
HOM, ANDREW R., and BRENT J. STEELE. 2010. "Open Horizons: The Temporal Visions of 
Reflexive Realism." International Studies Review 12: 271–300. 
HUMPHREYS, ADAM R. C. 2011. "The Heuristic Application of Explanatory Theories in 
International Relations." European Journal of International Relations 17: 257–77. 
HUTCHINGS, KIMBERLY. 2008. Time and World Politics: Thinking the Present. Manchester, 
U.K.: Manchester University Press. 
JACKSON, PATRICK THADDEUS. 2011. The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: 
Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics. Abingdon, 
U.K.: Routledge. 
JACKSON, PATRICK THADDEUS, and DANIEL H. NEXON. 1999. "Relations Before States: 
Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics." European Journal of 
International Relations 5: 291–332. 
KHAN, NAUREEN. 2013. "Skepticism Runs Deep among Lawmakers Pressed for Syria 
Action." Al Jazeera America, September 2. (Accessed September 3, 2013) 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/2/skepticism-runs-
deepamonglawmakerspressedforsyriaaction.html.  
KLINKE, IAN. 2013. "Chronopolitics A Conceptual Matrix." Progress in Human Geography 
37: 673–90. 
KRISTEVA, JULIA, ALICE JARDINE, and HARRY BLAKE. 1981. "Women’s Time." Signs 7: 13–
35. 
LACASSAGNE, AURÉLIE. 2012. "Cultures of Anarchy as Figurations: Reflections on Wendt, 
Elias and the English School." Human Figurations 1 (2). (Accessed November 30, 
2017). http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.11217607.0001.207. 
LINKLATER, ANDREW. 2016. Violence and Civilization in the Western States-Systems. 
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 
LUNDBORG, TOM. 2009. "The Becoming of the 'Event'." Theory & Event 12 (1). (Accessed 
December 1, 2017). 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v012/12.1.lundborg.html. 
LUNDBORG, TOM. 2011. Politics of the Event: Time, Movement, Becoming. Abingdon, U.K.: 
Routledge. 
  29 
LUNDBORG, TOM. 2016. "The Limits of Historical Sociology: Temporal Borders and the 
Reproduction of the ‘Modern’ Political Present." European Journal of International 
Relations 22: 99–121. 
LYNCH, CECELIA. 2014. Interpreting International Politics. New York, NY: Routledge. 
MCCOURT, DAVID M. 2016. "Practice Theory and Relationalism as the New Constructivism." 
International Studies Quarterly 60: 475–85. 
MCINTOSH, CHRISTOPHER. 2015. "Theory across Time: The Privileging of Time-Less Theory 
in International Relations." International Theory 7: 464–500. 
MEAD, GEORGE HERBERT. 2002. The Philosophy of the Present. Amherst, NY: Prometheus 
Books. 
MILLIKEN, JENNIFER. 1999. "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of 
Research and Methods." European Journal of International Relations 5: 225–54. 
MOORE, WILL H. 2006. "A Problem with Peace Science: The Dark Side of COW." Iowa City, 
IA. Unpublished manuscript. 
NANIBUSH, WANDA. 2016. In Time, Temporality and Violence in International Relations: 
(De)fatalizing the Present, Forging Radical Alternatives, edited by Anna M. 
Agathangelou and Kyle D. Killian, 104-118. Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge. 
NGUYEN, DUY LAP. 2008. "The Kieˆ’m Tha’o and the Uses of Disposable Time in the National 
Liberation Front." Public Culture 20: 375–94. 
NIEBUHR, REINHOLD. 2008. The Irony of American History. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
NIETZSCHE, FRIEDRICH W. 1982. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In The Portable Nietzsche, edited 
and translated by Walter Kaufmann, 103-439. New York, NY: Penguin. 
O’DRISCOLL, CIAN. 2015. "At All Costs and in Spite of All Terror? The Victory of Just War." 
Review of International Studies 41: 799–811. 
O’MALLEY, MICHAEL. 1990. Keeping Watch: A History of American Time. Washington, 
D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press. 
ONUF, NICHOLAS G. 2012. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and 
International Relations. Reissue. Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge. 
OULAHAN, RICHARD V. 1919. "Resolve on Victor’s Peace." New York Times: 1. 
OVID. 2004. Metamorphoses: A New Verse Translation. New edition. London, U.K.: Penguin 
Classics. 
POULIOT, VINCENT. 2007. "'Sobjectivism': Toward a Constructivist Methodology." 
International Studies Quarterly 51: 359–84. 
  30 
PRATT, SIMON FRANKEL. "A Relational View of Ontological Security in International 
Relations." International Studies Quarterly 61 (1): 78-85. 
SCHEUERMAN, WILLIAM E. 2004. Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time. 
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
SHAPIRO, MICHAEL J. 2016. Politics and Time. Malden, MA: Polity. 
SHAPIRO, MICHAEL J. 2010. The Time of the City. Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge. 
SHAW, KARENA. 2008. Indigeneity and Political Theory: Sovereignty and the Limits of the 
Political. Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge. 
SINGER, JOEL DAVID, and PAUL FRANCIS DIEHL. 1990. Measuring the Correlates of War. Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
SOLOMON, TY. 2014. "Time and Subjectivity in World Politics." International Studies 
Quarterly 58: 671–81. 
STEELE, BRENT J. 2008. Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the 
IR State. Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge. 
STEPHENS, ANGHARAD CLOSS. 2010. "Citizenship without Community: Time, Design and the 
City." Citizenship Studies 14: 31–46. 
STEVENS, TIM. 2015. Cyber Security and the Politics of Time. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
University Press. 
STÜRMER, MICHAEL. 2016. "Insecurity in ‘a Time out of Joint.’" OMFIF (Accessed August 9, 
2017). https://www.omfif.org/analysis/commentary/2016/january/insecurity-in-a-
time-out-of-joint/. 
TABBONI, SIMONETTA. 2001. "The Idea of Social Time in Norbert Elias." Time & Society 10: 
5-27. 
TOWNS, ANN. 2009. "The Status of Women as a Standard of 'Civilization.'" European Journal 
of International Relations 15: 681-706. 
VIJ, RITU. 2012. "Temporality, Civic Engagement, and Alterity Indo-Kei in Contemporary 
Japan." Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 37: 3–29. 
WALKER, R. B. J. 2009. After the Globe, Before the World. Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge. 
WALKER, R. B. J. 1993. Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. 
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 
WEINER, TIM. 2001. "A NATION CHALLENGED; Time Out of Joint In a Ruined Land." 
The New York Times, November 25. (Accessed August 9, 2017). 
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/25/world/a-nation-challenged-time-out-of-joint-in-
a-ruined-land.html.  
  31 
WHETHAM, DAVID. 2017. "Neither Victors nor Victims: Royal Wootton Bassett and Civil-
Military Relations in the 21st Century." In Moral Victories: The Ethics of Winning 
Wars, edited by Andrew R. Hom, Cian O’Driscoll, and Kurt Mills, 175-97. Oxford, 
U.K.: Oxford University Press. 
WICKHAM, GARY AND BARBARA EVERS. 2012. "Elias in the Footsteps of Hobbes?" Human 
Figurations 1 (1). (Accessed November 30, 2017). 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.11217607.0001.106. 
WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH. 2004. The Concept of Nature. Amherst, N.Y: Prometheus 
Books.  
